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87 
Response 
Government Endorsement: A Reply to 
Nelson Tebbe’s Government 
Nonendorsement 
Abner S. Greene†
Our First Amendment enshrines a key free speech princi-
ple—the state may not regulate private speech merely because 
it is persuasive. Much persuasive speech contributes to harmful 
ends—people listen to madmen and do bad things. But usually 
unless there is a tight nexus between speech and harm, the 
speech must be let free. Or so the U.S. Supreme Court has said, 
many times.
 
1 If there is no or little time for more speech in re-
sponse to incitement of unlawful action, face-to-face epithets, or 
excitement of crowds, then the police may step in.2 But with 
time for more speech, we are supposed to combat bad speech 
with better speech, fight persuasion with persuasion.3 There 
are a few areas other than the clear and present danger of 
physical harm in which doctrine permits speech regulation 
based on content—some libel,4 with its unique form of harm 
that is often impervious to more speech as a complete remedy; 
and some sexual speech, regulable in part because of outdated 
mores the Court has not seen fit to revisit,5
 
†  Leonard F. Manning Professor, Fordham Law School. Copyright © 
2013 by Abner S. Greene. 
 and in part because 
 1. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–72 (2010); Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam). 
 2. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (incitement); Feiner v. New York, 
340 U.S. 315, 320–21 (1951) (excitement); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 572, 574 (1942) (fighting words). 
 3. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring), overruled in part by Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444. 
 4. See generally, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 5. See generally, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 418 U.S. 939 
(1974); Miller v. California, 418 U.S. 915 (1974). 
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of harm to children.6
When the state speaks, we are usually not concerned with 
the kinds of harm that sometimes render private speech 
regulable. Much of the debate over the proper scope of govern-
ment speech is about whether and when it is appropriate for 
the state to take sides on controversial, unsettled matters of 
public policy. Should the state in a liberal democracy be as neu-
tral as possible, in its speaker role, regarding conceptions of the 
good life? If it may endorse one view over another in a matter of 
current social contest, what are the limits? And if there are lim-
its, are they properly seen as enshrined in the Constitution, or 
are they a matter of ideal political theory only? (As such, we 
could still plead with our representatives to toe such a line, 
rendering the ideal actual, but not based in constitutional ar-
gument.) 
 At bottom, though, the law robustly pro-
tects the right to try to persuade others of all sorts of ideas and 
ends. 
I have taken what is sometimes called a “thick perfection-
ist” (or what Nelson Tebbe calls an “engaged democracy”)7 posi-
tion in this debate.8
 
 6. See generally, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 With a few limits, the state, as a repre-
sentative of the people in their capacity as citizens, may and 
should take distinctive positions on contested issues to achieve 
certain public goods and to teach what the state believes to be 
true. Citizens generally should understand that the state is just 
one voice in such debates, and should give the state’s point of 
view whatever weight it deserves on the merits, adding what-
ever dollop of authority is appropriate because it is the state 
speaking. Just as we permit and desire a robust exchange of 
many points of view when private persons are speaking, so 
should we adopt a similarly pluralistic attitude toward gov-
ernment speech. Some governmental units may, for example, 
want to teach their teenagers about condom use to prevent dis-
ease and teenage pregnancy; others may prefer to tout the vir-
tues of abstinence; still others may want to teach both possibili-
ties; and others may prefer to stay out of the subject matter 
 7. See Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
648, 700 (2013). 
 8. See generally Abner S. Greene, Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibili-
ties, and Virtues, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 421 (2013) (reviewing James E. Flem-
ing and Linda C. McClain’s Ordered Liberty); Abner S. Greene, Government 
Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1667 (2001); Abner S. 
Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2000) [hereinafter 
Greene, Government of the Good]. 
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entirely. There’s nothing in the Constitution or in liberal demo-
cratic theory, properly conceived, that should limit the state 
here, or in most other matters of social policy debate. 
Others have argued for a kind of strict neutrality in state 
speech—either for classic libertarian reasons or because of the 
notion that it is proper for the liberal democratic state to pro-
mote certain ends of the just and the right, but not of the good.9 
Still others have adopted more “thin perfectionist” (or what 
Tebbe calls “framework democracy”)10 positions. Linda McClain 
(sometimes writing with Jim Fleming) urges the state to help 
citizens develop their capacities for autonomy, or self-
government;11 Corey Brettschneider advises the state to pro-
mote free and equal citizenship.12
In Government Nonendorsement, Tebbe isn’t really con-
cerned with this debate about the proper scope of government 
speech. His “nonendorsement” is not the nonendorsement of ei-
ther the strict neutralists or the thin perfectionists. Rather, he 
is (properly) concerned with various constitutional rights that 
the state might violate through, inter alia, speaking or funding 
speech. If the state were to engage in racist speech or fund pri-
vate speakers to advance a racist message, Tebbe credibly ar-
gues this would violate the Equal Protection Clause.
 These virtues of autonomy 
and equality are ones we should applaud and seek to promote 
in various ways. But they are comprehensively liberal ideas, 
and the state should not be limited to promoting them, at least 
not in a pluralistic nation such as ours, where political liberal-
ism should be seen as generating a multitude of ideas about the 
good life, from both the private and public sector. 
13 When 
the state erects a religious symbol that a reasonable observer 
would take as endorsing one religion over others, doctrine 
holds, and Tebbe agrees, that this violates the Establishment 
Clause.14 (He also thinks it might violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.)15
 
 9. See Greene, Government of the Good, supra note 
 Tebbe also correctly notes that some state speech 
8, at 18–22. 
 10. Tebbe, supra note 7, at 697. 
 11. See generally JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIB-
ERTY (2013); Linda C. McClain,Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Pro-
motion of Good Lives: Beyond “Empty” Toleration to Toleration as Respect, 59 
OHIO ST. L.J. 19 (1998). 
 12. See COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT 
SHOULD IT SAY? (2012). 
 13. See Tebbe, supra note 7, at 658–65. 
 14. See id. at 649. 
 15. See id. at 709–12. 
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might rise to the level of placing an undue burden on a wom-
an’s right to choose whether to have an abortion, thus violating 
the Due Process Clause.16
None of this has anything to do with the freedom of speech. 
That part of the First Amendment says that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”
 
17
For the most part, at least regarding these three examples, 
Tebbe does not disagree, but he does offer an alternative theory 
regarding the state racist speech example, suggesting such 
might abridge the freedom of speech as well as violate equal 
protection.
 The Free 
Speech Clause is properly understood as placing various limits 
on federal, state, and local governmental regulation of private 
speech, as discussed above. Why should we think it also limits 
state speech? State speech might violate other constitutional 
rights—such as equal protection, nonestablishment, and due 
process—but there’s no reason to think the kind of state speech 
discussed in the preceding paragraph also violates the Free 
Speech Clause. 
18
In this section of his article, Tebbe also suggests that a 
concern for “full citizenship—for meaningful participation in 
political and social life”—may be properly understood, in the 
government speech setting, as a “citizenship theory of free 
speech.”
 In part he references an argument advanced by 
Owen Fiss: just as the regulation of private hate speech might 
be permissible because such speech tends to silence its victims, 
so might state hate speech improperly marginalize the expres-
sive lives of racial minorities. I don’t have a firm position on 
this, but it is a plausible use of the Free Speech Clause. It’s cer-
tainly possible, though, for state racist speech to be unconstitu-
tional under the Equal Protection Clause without going so far 
as to silence private speakers; thus, the Free Speech Clause 
wouldn’t come into play. 
19
 
 16. See id. at 688–92. 
 To the extent this is something other than a recapitu-
lation of the Fiss theory of state speech harming private speech 
by drowning it out or otherwise marginalizing it, why should 
we ground the concern in free speech values rather than in 
equal protection values? State action that improperly vilifies 
persons by race or other protected characteristics may indeed 
diminish the citizenship of such persons. If the Equal Protec-
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 18. See Tebbe, supra note 7, at 665–67. 
 19. Id. at 667. 
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tion Clause is properly read as covering state speech as well as 
other forms of state action, it is the proper doctrinal home for 
the diminishment of citizenship that derogatory state speech 
might foster. 
Tebbe also claims that an incumbent political party could 
not constitutionally use the apparatus of state to urge voters to 
keep the ins in and the outs out.20 This seems right, and the 
question is, where does the Constitution say so? Tebbe offers 
the Free Speech Clause. This kind of use of dominant political 
power to block the channels of political change—or at least to 
place the heavy machinery and cash of the state behind such 
change—is one of the key concerns of the famous Carolene 
Products footnote four.21
Other than the possibility that state hate speech could, 
under certain circumstances, violate the Free Speech Clause, 
and that clause’s presence among others in preventing incum-
bent officials from using state power to promote their own 
reelection, where else might the Free Speech Clause limit gov-
ernment speech? Here’s an area of the case law that Tebbe does 
not discuss:
 But is the problem really that citizens’ 
freedom of speech is being abridged? To the extent that voting 
is speech, I suppose it makes some sense. But there are a 
plethora of provisions in the Constitution that are either specif-
ically about voting or that in some instances apply to voting. 
The Free Speech Clause is one of them. Rather than specifically 
locating a constitutional right against “government electioneer-
ing” in freedom of speech, we would do better to see this as a 
structural right that has its home in many places at once. 
22 When the state speaks, it should own up to that 
fact. It should not hide behind hired agents, giving the 
(mis)impression that the agents, as private persons, are speak-
ing.23 This concern with attribution and misattribution might 
have a proper home in the Free Speech Clause, in the following 
way. The Court has long protected a robust right not to speak, 
or right against compelled speech, and has said that right is the 
inverse of our normally protected right to speak.24
 
 20. See id. at 668–76. 
 Although I 
 21. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 22. He mentions transparency and anti-ventriloquism as theoretical con-
cerns, but does not explore their connection to the compelled speech case law. 
See Tebbe, supra note 7, at 656–57. 
 23. See Abner S. Greene, (Mis)Attribution, 87 DENVER U. L. REV. 833, 
844–48 (2010) . 
 24. See id. at 839–44 (discussing cases). 
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find that doctrinal move complicated,25
In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n,
 and never fully justified 
by the Court, plenty of cases so hold. In two recent opinions, 
the Court addressed the intersection of state speech and com-
pelled speech, with some Justices expressing a concern that 
state-fostered misattribution of speech could violate the free-
dom of speech or the freedom of expressive association. 
26 the Court con-
fronted a First Amendment challenge to beef advertisements 
funded by Department of Agriculture assessments targeted at 
beef producers and importers. The claim, based on prior case 
law, was of the compelled speech (or compelled subsidization of 
speech) variety—that the targeted assessments compelled 
plaintiffs to support speech they didn’t want to support. 
Johanns’ core holding was that if speech is the government’s, 
neither a compelled speech nor a compelled subsidy challenge 
is available; here, the ads were formally those of the U.S. gov-
ernment.27 In dissent, Justice Souter asserted that the govern-
ment should have a duty of transparency in these settings, to 
make clear that it and not a private party is responsible for the 
ads. Otherwise, if a reasonable viewer would see the ads as 
those of a private party, a compelled speech claim should lie 
(via the compelled subsidization of speech).28 Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion was at least open to the possibility of an as-
applied First Amendment challenge “if it were established . . . 
that individual beef advertisements were attributed to [the 
plaintiffs].”29
In Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republi-
can Party,
 
30
 
 25. See id. See generally Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Prob-
lem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451 (1995). 
 the state of Washington allowed primary election 
candidates to self-designate party preferences, which would 
then be listed on the ballots that voters would see. The plaintiff 
political party’s concern was that voters would misattribute 
such preferences, assuming party backing. This is a case not 
about state speech per se, but rather about a distinctive kind of 
 26. 544 U.S. 550 (2005). 
 27. See id. at 559–62. 
 28. See id. at 570 (Souter, J., dissenting). Strictly speaking, a compelled 
speech claim and a compelled subsidization of speech claim are different, but 
the difference doesn’t matter for purposes of this discussion. 
 29. Id. at 565. For more detailed discussion of Johanns, see Greene, supra 
note 23, at 834–37. 
 30. 552 U.S. 442 (2008). For more detailed discussion of Grange, see 
Greene, supra note 23, at 837–38. 
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private speech authorized by state law, in the setting of elec-
tions administered by the state. As in Johanns, the argument 
was that the system was not transparent enough, that voters 
would make incorrect assumptions about the candidates’ self-
designations, violating the freedom of expressive association (a 
type of First Amendment claim) of the party. The Court reject-
ed the facial claim, because the system (which had not yet been 
tested) might work just fine to clarify the self-designations.31 
Chief Justice Roberts, concurring, was concerned that in prac-
tice misattribution might occur,32 and Justice Scalia, dissent-
ing, would have invalidated the law on its face, because of com-
pelled association between a self-designating candidate and the 
named political party.33
Tebbe criticizes some dicta from Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum
 
34 as suggesting that, apart from the Establishment 
Clause, there may be no constitutional limits on state speech.35
Tebbe concedes that whether and when the state may en-
gage in viewpoint-based speech is not what he is writing 
about.
 
And as discussed above, Tebbe discusses various constitutional 
provisions that might be violated by egregious instances of gov-
ernment speech. Summum, though, on its facts, was not a hard 
case, and we should see its dicta as just that. The core holding 
was that municipalities may choose which fixed monuments to 
place in state-owned parks, even if such choices (necessarily) 
reflect support for some viewpoints over others. The Johanns 
holding is similar: once we identify the beef advertisements as 
government speech, then there is no constitutional objection to 
them, from compelled speech, compelled funding of speech, or 
any other clause or doctrinal hook. The government is indeed 
promoting a specific idea—it’s good for y’all to buy and consume 
beef. That’s not uncontroversial—neither are choices about 
which monuments to erect in city-owned parks—but the con-
tested nature of the speech in these cases proved irrelevant to 
the Court’s constitutional analysis, and correctly so. 
36
 
 31. See Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 454–58. 
 That’s fine, but then it is a bit problematic to call the 
piece “Government Nonendorsement” and to write: “[T]he Con-
stitution properly imposes a broad principle of government 
 32. See id. at 459 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 33. See id. at 462 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 34. 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
 35. Tebbe, supra note 7, at 648–49, 654–56, 668, 709–10, 712.  
 36. See Tebbe, supra note 7, at 655 n.25. 
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nonendorsement. That principle cuts across multiple provi-
sions—including equal protection, due process, and free speech 
itself . . . .”37
Generally speaking, we live in a nation with an active and 
vibrant principle of government endorsement. There are some 
exceptions, and Tebbe’s article helpfully picks them out. State 
speech that disparages based on race, or that promotes one re-
ligion over others, or that places a significant burden on a 
woman’s right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy, 
or that uses the apparatus of state to push the electorate to 
keep incumbents in office—these are all constitutionally prob-
lematic and are properly seen as exceptions to an otherwise ca-
pacious government speech power. That capacious power is in 
play every day when federal, state, and local governments seek 
to persuade citizens to make certain choices over others, and 
that some ideas are better than others. The state does this by 
supporting enacted legislation and promulgated regulations, 
and through public-service advertisements, school curricular 
choices, curatorial choices at public museums and in public 
parks, and funding conditions for public support of the arts. It 
does so through government employees and through hired pri-
vate agents. And it does so regarding constitutionally protected 
rights as well as in settings that do not involve such rights. 
Thus, the state might promote a vigorous anti-smoking cam-
paign (there’s no right to smoke cigarettes). But the state might 
also promote a vigorous campaign to persuade women to carry 
their fetuses to term; so long as such a campaign does not place 
an undue burden on the choice, it is constitutional. And the 
state might promote speech itself—even though we have a right 
not to speak, indeed, a right to remain silent. 
 Furthermore, that the state may engage in view-
point-based speech extends to contested issues and to condi-
tional funding situations (bracketing here the ventrilo-
quism/transparency issue); nowhere does Tebbe dispute this. 
Thus, there are really two separate debates potentially in play 
here—one about whether liberal democratic political theory, or 
our Constitution, imposes limits on state persuasion generally, 
and a separate one about whether state speech sometimes 
might violate specific constitutional provisions, such as the 
Equal Protection, Establishment, or Due Process Clause (or 
perhaps the Free Speech Clause itself). 
Government endorsement—even in hotly contested mat-
 
 37. Id. at 650. 
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ters, and even in the realm of constitutionally protected 
rights—is a proper tool of state, even in liberal democracies 
such as ours, and so the Court has properly held. Government 
nonendorsement, at times, is appropriate, but it is the excep-
tion to an otherwise fairly robust rule. 
 
